Power in the Changing Global Order by Martin A. Smith

Author:Martin A. Smith
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Wiley
Published: 2012-06-01T00:00:00+00:00

From unipolar assumptions to multilateral accommodation?

Were the shifts noted and discussed in the two case studies here engendered purely or mainly by drivers specific to the issues and circumstances involved? Or is there evidence of more general underlying and deliberative change in the Bush administration’s thinking and approaches to international affairs over the course of its two terms in office? If the latter is indeed the case, where did the main impetus for this come from? The discussions in this section will attempt to answer these questions.

In the autumn of 2002, when debates about a possible US-led invasion of Iraq were moving into high gear, John Ikenberry contended that, historically: ‘The secret of the United States’ long brilliant run as the world’s leading state was its ability and willingness to exercise power within alliance and multinational frameworks, which made its power and agenda more acceptable to allies and other key states around the world.’ Ikenberry added that, in his view, ‘This achievement has now been put at risk by the [Bush] administration’s new thinking.’30

Subsequent events, especially in Iraq, lent substance to Ikenberry’s forebodings. The consequences of the administration’s downgrading – if not indeed denigration – of multilateralism in its early years became apparent in the run up to the Iraq War. As noted in chapter 5, two of the major NATO allies – France and Germany – consistently opposed the use of military force, at least within the timeframe that the Bush administration was suggesting in late 2002 and early 2003. Far from attempting to conciliate the governments of these states, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld chose instead to stigmatize them publicly as ‘old Europe’. By the spring of 2003, there was a virtually complete breakdown in effective consultation and multilateral interaction amongst the four states which had formed the heart of NATO since the 1950s (the fourth being the UK, which, under Tony Blair, was solidly on the US side).

This marked the Iraq crisis out from previous instances of strained relations amongst NATO allies, such as during controversies over the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe during the early 1980s. In these cases, although strained, multilateralism had not broken down to the same extent as in the early 2000s. The discipline imposed by the bilateral Cold War international structure, and the consequent shared perceptions that alliance solidarity was a paramount requirement for Western defence and security, was no doubt important before the 1990s. By definition, this same discipline did not hold good in the era of the post-Cold War ‘unipolar moment’. Comparisons should not simply be based on structural changes, however. Just because earlier structural constraints no longer existed, the US government did not have to choose a markedly less consultative and more unilateral approach to the conduct of its international relations. This was not pre-determined.

As discussed in chapter 5, a prime consideration characterizing the Bush administration’s approach to fighting its post-9/11 war on terror was not to have the military effort impeded by ‘inflexible’ coalitions. By placing the

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